

OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR:  
CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE  
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE

BY  
W. ERIC HERR

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF  
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES  
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 1996

## 1. **Disclaimer**

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

2.

## 3. **About The Author**

Major W. Eric Herr received his commission from the Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Colorado where he earned a BS in Electrical Engineering. After completing pilot training, he went on to fly F-15C in Japan, Iceland, Arizona, and Alaska. He has served in operational and training squadrons as an instructor pilot, weapons officer, flight commander, and assistant operations officer. Major Herr graduated Squadron Officer's School in 1986 and earned an MS in Systems Management from the University of Southern California in 1987. He is a 1990 distinguished graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course and Attended Air Command and Staff College in 1995. Major Herr is a senior pilot with over 2100 fighter hours and currently works in the Joint Staff, Directorate for Force Structures, Resources, and Assessment (J-8), Requirements, Assessments, and Integration Division (RAID).

4.

## 5. **Acknowledgments**

My sincere thanks go Dr. Karl Mueller who painstakingly reviewed drafts that expanded the limits of rough—his constant availability and depth of knowledge were instrumental in the successful completion of this project. I had equal access to Dr. James Corum’s time and expertise; smooth prose and clear presentation came at his direction. The credit for any remaining vagaries and logical flaws remains with me. The primary sources of the first hand knowledge for this project were the officers and civil servants of the United States Central Command. Thanks to Mr. Edward Fugit, Mr. Jay Hines, Colonels Perry Baltimore and Allen Peck, Lieutenant Colonels Timothy Scully and Randy Kolton, Majors Christopher Gordon, Gordon Mereness, Philip Oppenheimer, and Brett Williams. They all went out of their way to assist me in gathering information and took time away from busy schedules to talk about the details of Vigilant Warrior. My final and deepest thanks go to my wife, Lisa. She lovingly endured my antics and those of my four sons, who were forced to suffer weeks without computer games while I stared at a Microsoft Word screen.

6.

## 7. Abstract

This thesis examines Operation Vigilant Warrior, the United States response to the movement of two Iraqi armored divisions toward the Kuwaiti border during the first week of October 1994, to better prepare defense planners for future crises. The action turned back Iraq’s aggression and provided insight into options for crisis resolution. The research begins with a general examination of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the reconstruction of the events, beginning with US detection of the Iraqi movement and ending with their withdrawal and the demobilization of US forces. Primary research sources included interviews, official press releases, and domestic and foreign periodicals. These, combined with secondary sources and theoretical works lead to the conclusion that US conventional deterrence doctrine should be updated to reflect the deterrence lessons of Vigilant Warrior. The work proposes a four element model for effective deterrence based on *power*, *agility*, *intent*, and *resolve*. These measures should be applied with the knowledge that deterrence is based on the perceptions and values of the target decision-maker(s) and that deterrence in crisis situations is related to the general conditions of deterrence before crises erupt. Increased use of remote sensors and digital data distribution combined with skilled human analysis may allow US conventional deterrence forces to rely more on agility than on their latent power. An agile deterrence strategy may be the most effective route to stability in future regional crises.

1.

## 2. Contents

Chapter

## 8. Disclaimer

About The Author

Acknowledgments

Abstract

1 Introduction 1

2 Saddam Hussein's Motives 7

3 Operation Vigilant Warrior 24

4 Deterrence Theory and Doctrine 36

5 The Future of Conventional Deterrence 61

Selected Bibliography 66

## 9.

### **Illustrations**

Figure

1 Saddam Hussein's Objectives And Tools 9

2 US Active Duty Force Strength 18

3 Iraqi Forces Near Kuwait During OVW 25

4 *The Washington Post* Headlines Demonstrated Speed Of Operations 27

5 Formal CINC-To-Ambassador Coordination Structure 31

6 Types Of Deterrence 40

7 George And Smoke Deterrence Flow Chart 44

8 USCENTCOM Multidimensional Deterrence In OVW 49

## 1. Chapter 1

### 10. Introduction

*Saddam Hussein has shown the world before, with his acts of aggression and his weapons of mass destruction, that he cannot be trusted. Iraq's troop movements and threatening statements in recent days are more proof of this. In 1990, Saddam Hussein assembled a force on the border of Kuwait and then invaded. Last week, he moved another force toward the same border. Because of what happened in 1990, this provocation requires a strong response from the United States and the international community.*

President Bill Clinton

10 October 1994

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) activated its crisis action team (CAT) at noon on Friday, 7 October 1994 to oversee the execution of the US military response to a buildup of Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti border. The US response, designated Operation Vigilant Warrior (OVW), provides a unique case study of the effective application of conventional deterrence theory. This thesis examines the planning and execution of OVW and presents a case for expanding United States Joint Doctrine using a four dimensional model. The model disaggregates the concepts of capability and will into the more descriptive elements of power, agility, intent, and resolve. Vigilant Warrior teaches that the effective application of deterrence requires understanding and exploiting the connections between the military and diplomatic instruments of national power. As the US reduces forward presence and increasingly relies on crisis response, understanding OVW will help defense planners to protect allied and coalition partners and other American interests abroad.

This project began as an open-ended analysis to determine what lessons from Vigilant Warrior could be used to improve our ability to avert future war with effective conventional deterrence. During the initial phase of research, two aspects of the operation stood out: a large initial movement of ground forces compared to a relatively modest movement of air assets, and the rapid capitulation by Saddam Hussein. Later study of OVW revealed military reliance on diplomatic instruments far beyond the author's expectations. Finally, examination of all but the most recent US doctrine showed that it includes almost no useable framework dedicated to the application of conventional deterrence theory.

Throughout the Cold War, US deterrence theory was primarily focused on the balance of United States and Soviet nuclear forces. Joint Pub 1-02 defines deterrence in terms of fear—the consequences of counteraction. It stands on the psychological aspect of retaliation more than the possibility that defensive actions can deny anticipated gains. This definition is insufficient to meet the needs of US conventional forces. While punishment remains the linchpin of nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence can also be based on eliminating or limiting the adversary's ability to act. The nature and destructive power of nuclear weapons make punishment-based nuclear deterrence a viable option, but the global mobility of today's forces supports expanded use of denial in conventional deterrence strategy. The ability to achieve operational effects with precision attack underwrites this aspect of conventional deterrence while limiting collateral damage. Doctrinal evolution has begun, but it is incomplete.

The USCENTCOM model for deterrence is based on three mutually supporting ideas: establishing the military *capability* to conduct successful combat operations, showing the *willingness* to commit forces to combat, and demonstrating the *resolve* to see operations through to completion. According to the model, absence of any one of these three components may result in a failure of deterrence. Effective implementation, therefore, is

inextricably linked to the degree of coordination between the military and diplomatic instruments of power. Understanding the mechanisms and coordination channels that bind force and diplomacy prepares the military planner to wrest the maximum deterrent value from each unit of available force. The conventional deterrence demonstrated by OVW suggests the need to expand the USCENTCOM model to include a fourth factor: *agility*. The element of agility is important because US forces face the prospect of expanded conventional deterrence tasking as the world continues to move from a relatively stable bipolar balance toward an uncertain future. Implementing a strategy that relies on agility may allow the US to enhance the effectiveness of conventional deterrence without increasing the size of its standing military forces.

In the emerging unipolar international structure, revisionist challenges to world stability will demand conventional deterrent responses by the US. Some challenges will be minor tests of US resolve without individually significant negative consequences. Others will be expansionist ventures that must be squelched to preserve the sovereignty of less powerful nations against the advances of regional aggressors. The United States will need to respond to these challenges with the appropriate mix of diplomatic and military initiatives and with the proper mix of military forces. Insufficient counters are likely to lead to increasing adventurism and deteriorating international order. Inefficient responses may lead to loss of domestic political support for international engagement if high cost interventions fail to yield timely economic and political payoffs. This paper presents an argument that low cost, immediate responses may be as successful as larger responses that take longer to implement.

To demonstrate the utility of Vigilant Warrior as a deterrence case study, it is first necessary to demonstrate that the Iraqi force movement constituted an actual threat to Kuwaiti territorial sovereignty. Analysts have put forth a variety of explanations for the Iraqi troop movements that prompted OVW. Chapter 2 examines those theories and provides background information to familiarize the reader with the crisis. Each of the theories has merit, but none provides a convincing, complete picture of Saddam Hussein's motivations. The question of motivation is important because some have argued that Saddam had no intention of attacking and there was no deterrence demonstrated by OVW. Chapter 2 shows this is an oversimplification. This discussion of intent paves the way for a detailed description of OVW.

Chapter 3 provides a chronological account of the planning and execution of Vigilant Warrior. While Iraqi force movements and the US responses are addressed for the reader's convenience, the principal aspect of OVW under direct scrutiny is the link between the military and diplomatic instruments and how it affected the agility of the US response. Three issues are of particular importance:

1. using military intelligence and diplomatic channels to assure coalition partners share a common view of the threat
2. using diplomatic channels to insure the availability of coalition and host nation support
3. using public policy statements to demonstrate US and coalition resolve

Chapter 4 begins with a general survey of deterrence literature. Categories of deterrence and their definitions provide a framework for analysis of Vigilant Warrior. A review of joint deterrence doctrine is presented along with selected service views. The theoretical work and evolution of the military doctrine show that the USCENTCOM model is an incremental advance in conventional deterrence thought. The author presents a further evolution using an expanded model to describe effective deterrence. The new model states deterrence is based on a synergistic interaction among four factors: *power*, *agility*, *intent*, and *resolve*. Power and agility are the components of capability that are useful to military planners, and intent and resolve are the constituents of will. The model provides a framework for planners tasked with developing conventional deterrence strategies.

Chapter 5 summarizes and draws conclusions from the theory and evidence presented in the previous chapters. It reviews how conventional deterrence can be improved by exploiting diplomatic channels to enhance military power, and it explains why agility may be an important pillar of deterrence doctrine. The closing sections outline suggested topics for further research and stress the value of updating doctrine.

## 1. Chapter 2

### 1. Saddam Hussein's Motives

*What he has done so far makes no sense at all to me. But if he continues in the direction he's going, it looks like the same buildup, in many ways almost an identical buildup, to what he did when he invaded Kuwait before. Therefore, we dare not assume anything other than that he is preparing for another invasion, and our preparedness needs to reflect that.*

—Secretary of Defense William Perry

10 October 1994


Western observers may never know Saddam Hussein's true motivation behind the October 1994 movement of two Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) armor divisions to provocative positions close to the Iraq-Kuwait border. While investigation into the likely reasons behind his actions is important, it is not critical to determine the answer with certainty—military and political planners always operate in an ambiguous environment. A convincing argument that Saddam planned to attack or planned to keep an attack option available, however, is useful because it demonstrates greater relevance for later conclusions. Studies seeking a model for effective deterrence must overcome a dilemma: cases of failed deterrence often rely on the assumption that contrary actions would have prevented war—they assume *some* feasible action could have dissuaded the attacker, but this is not always the case. Given that an attacker could have been deterred, the studies are still limited to supported assertions concerning which deterrent actions would have worked. On the other hand, examining wars that did not occur relies on the assumption that war would have been likely if the deterrent actions had not been effective. If individual cases are to yield useful results, clear demonstration of the underlining assumptions is important. Insofar as cases are considered in aggregate, however, a robust proof of intent in each case is somewhat less critical.

Vigilant Warrior may have been an example of overreaction by US leadership, but it is more likely the first prominent example of effective conventional deterrence by the US in the post cold war era. This chapter considers a number of possible motivations behind the October 1994 troop movement by examining Saddam Hussein's sources of power and the effect he hoped to achieve through the deployment of RGFC divisions toward the Kuwaiti border. The argument then moves on to evaluate four possible mechanisms for change to determine if it is reasonable to believe a violation of Kuwaiti territory would have occurred if the US failed to respond to Saddam's provocation.

It is difficult to categorize the explanations of Iraq's intentions offered by various Saddam Hussein watchers and policymakers. A cursory examination shows overlapping motives supported by conflicting evidence. Deeper analysis reveals a common thread. The following sections show that Iraqi policy is formulated to support the continued authoritarian rule of Saddam Hussein and that UN sanctions tended to undermine Saddam's power. Saddam moved his troops in October 1994 to mitigate the effects of the UN sanctions against Iraq. The issue that bears on the deterrence lessons of OVW is *how* Saddam thought moving troops would mitigate the effects of the sanctions—the mechanism that would achieve the desired effect. Of the mechanisms gleaned from the literature—direct suppression of acute rebellion, testing US resolve to redirect Iraqi domestic discontent, making a show of force for intimidation and international attention, or using force to gain a territorial bargaining chip—the last seems the most logical.

#### 1. What Makes Saddam Tick

Iraqi policy serves the stability and strength of Saddam's regime. Social and economic factors, while not an indication of benevolence, are important to Saddam Hussein because they influence the level of effort required to control the Iraqi people. Issues involving the PLO are significant because Saddam has used the Palestinian cause to unite the Iraqis in support of pan-Arabism. Finally, the military dimension of Saddam's power is critical because he has expertly used the same instrument both to control his people and to unite them in the name of national sovereignty against common external foes. Saddam Hussein is "a hardy and extremely shrewd survivor" who has repeatedly "resorted to force as the only way to get what he wanted."



Saddam Hussein's record makes one point clear above all else. Any single domestic or diplomatic interest—nationalism, economic development, pan-Arabism, or military success in the field—pales in consequence when balanced against challenges to his survival and his Baath Party leadership in Iraq; indeed, the function of each is to strengthen his regime. The Baath Party and the Revolutionary Command Council—Hussein's forum for personal control of the state—have supported the growth of Iraqi nationalism. "He manipulated the history of ancient Mesopotamia and grafted bits and pieces of its symbols onto modern-day Iraq. He invented his own mythology, creating a personality cult to make himself all things to all Iraqis." The

concentration of economic development in and around Baghdad shows its importance as a source of Saddam's power.

The benefits of modernization, as measured by education, housing, health care and relative sophistication of the population, are concentrated in Baghdad and its environs. As a rule, the further the distance from Baghdad, the greater the attenuation of these benefits, regardless of the ethnic or sectarian composition of the population.

Before the 1991 Gulf War, the overwhelming debt Iraq accrued during its war against Iran had stalled its economy. Saddam Hussein went to great lengths to isolate the Iraqi people from the economic and social effects, but the war left Iraq with about 300,000 dead and 750,000 casualties and an external debt of \$60 billion. Iraq's economy was in desperate shape before the Gulf War: after the war it was nearly destroyed. Nationalism and economic progress have been important elements of Saddam Hussein's appeal.

Saddam has also presented himself as a champion of pan-Arabism and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

In spite of the official condemnations of Saddam's actions by the governments of nearby Middle Eastern countries [during the invasion of Kuwait], most of the people in these countries see Hussein as an Arab nationalist hero . . . Saddam had proved to most Arabs that they could face down the Americans.

His support for Arab causes, however, has been based more on pragmatism than idealism—it has yielded legitimacy at home and in the Arab world at large.

The complement of Saddam's political pragmatism is his military might. In the months before Vigilant Warrior, refitting Iraq's 400,000-person army was a high priority. In spite of limited foreign reserves, Iraq bought T-72 tank parts from Russian and China as well as anti-tank and air-defense missiles from Bulgaria; it also expanded ballistic-missile research. But even Hussein's military adventures ceased



when faced with serious threats to his hold on Iraqi power. Hussein demonstrated a talent for placation when he ceded claims to half the Shatt al-Arab to end Iranian support of Kurdish rebels in 1975. While Iraq's internal and external policies address a variety of issues, their common objective is to increase the security and strength of Saddam Hussein and his inner circle of key governmental officials. Any attempt to understand the possible motivations behind the October 1994 troop movements must be framed in how they affected the legitimacy and strength of Saddam Hussein.

## 2. The Impact of UN Sanctions Against Iraq

There is no doubt that having UN sanctions lifted was among Saddam Hussein's highest priorities in October 1994. Even before the Gulf War, the Iraqi economy was beset with debt: it also faced the combined impediments of low oil prices and Kuwaiti production in excess of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas that contributed to keeping prices low. The aftermath of the Gulf War left Iraq cut off from the world's economy by UN sanctions that banned all Iraqi exports and all imports except food, medicine, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. Particularly hard hit by the UN sanctions was the Iraqi *center*—the middle, professional, and intellectual class in and around Baghdad. They had endured 2000 percent annual inflation and looked forward to as much as a 30 percent lien on future Iraqi income for Gulf War reparations. While Saddam Hussein had traditionally faced opposition in the Shiite South and Kurdish North, the center had been his bastion of support. The sanctions threatened Saddam Hussein's political security by punishing his staunchest supporters. In September 1994, after the UN Security Council renewed the sanctions against Iraq, "Hussein halved monthly food rations, and food prices doubled in one day." The sanctions also aided his domestic enemies by limiting the resources that Hussein could direct against Kurdish and Shiite uprisings.

Saddam spent much of 1994 embarked on a campaign to undermine UN sanctions using economic influence, metered cooperation with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), and appeals to the international community on behalf of the innocent victims of the sanctions. By October 1994, Iraq had gained substantial support to lift the sanctions. France, Russia, and China wanted sanctions lifted. All three were in position to gain lucrative contracts to repair Iraqi infrastructure. France and Russia championed opening Iraqi oil production to allow repayment of the massive debts (approximately \$5 billion owed to France and \$6 billion to Russia) that Iraq had accumulated before the Gulf War. Saddam was making advances on the international scene. He embarked on a "charm offensive" by increasing his level of cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors. He hoped to parlay recent cooperation with UNSCOM into a schedule for lifting sanctions. The Iraqi News Agency painted a hopeful picture on September 14 saying the issues of when and how to lift sanctions would be raised substantially during the meetings Deputy Prime Minister Tariq `Aziz was to have with the member states who were to participate in the 49th session of the UN General Assembly.

## 3. Suppressing Rebellion

"One excellent reason for dispatching the Guards to the Kuwait border could have been to find them employment that would make them less of a threat to Saddam himself." This explanation has limited value because its supporters base their conclusions primarily on speculation. Unconfirmed reports of military coup attempts are the primary evidence for this position. But of the two divisions that moved to the Kuwaiti border, the Hammurabi and al Nida, only one moved from the Baghdad vicinity, elements of the al Nida Division left the northern region (they marshaled at the Mosul rail yard), where Kurdish activity had previously been a problem. US intelligence experts had no information leading them to believe the movements were in response to an army revolt or a revolt by some unit of the Army. While the movements could have been in response to anticipated Shiite activity in the South, the 15th Mechanized Brigade of the Hammurabi Division deployed 20 kilometers from the Kuwaiti border and oriented its artillery south toward Kuwait. And, again, the

intelligence community was "not aware of any other event" within Iraq that might account for the troop movement. No specific incident in Iraq accounts for the movement, and the troops did not take action against the marsh Arabs while deployed in the South. The Iraqi troop movement probably had nothing to do with averting a military coup or quelling acute unrest near the Kuwaiti border.

#### 4. Testing United States Resolve

Saddam's intent may have been "to distract his people from the deteriorating conditions by appealing to their nationalist pride." Any military action against US regional presence would, by default, have been a test of US resolve. "Saddam may have gained the impression that a U.S. president who withdrew his military forces from hostile fire in Somalia and gave easy terms of departure to a Haitian dictator" would be vulnerable to military coercion. Substantial US force reductions combined with a perceived lack of American commitment could have inspired a plan for *victory* over the US in the Iraqi domestic political arena. Saddam seasoned his summer charm campaign with references to "the evil intentions which the U.S. Administration has attempted to cloak." The Iraqi press also presented the government's position that the US used the UN flag to cover its dictatorship over international society, invasion of Panama, and savage aggression on Iraq. It "is also how it invaded Somalia and killed its hungry defenseless people." The Iraqi people were ready to accept renewed rhetoric directed against the source of their economic woes. Saddam may have had to fall back on his role of nationalist hero and anti-Western champion by showing his military power—the same strength the Americans had been unable to destroy during their savage aggression. If Saddam did not intend to attack, however—if he wanted to show his people how he could make the US respond to his initiatives—it seems illogical that the Iraqi press did not emphasize the RGFC movements until after Iraq announced the force withdrawal on 10 October. As late as 7 October, the Iraqi chargé d'affaires in Brussels denied the movements, saying "no Iraqi units have moved toward Kuwait." When the Iraqi press *did* address the movements, they referred to them as internal exercises and in no way linked them to Iraqi steadfastness against US aggression. If the RGFC movements *were* a test of US resolve, they were not a test administered for the benefit of the Iraqi public.

#### 5. Show of Force

Show of force theories for the troop movement rely on international attention as the mechanism for change and account for the possible benefits gained but do not weigh the cost of the international good will Iraq gave away. One pundit suggested Saddam was "trying to draw media attention to get economic sanctions lifted." *The New York Times* reported "the troop movements, the most threatening since the Gulf War, were probably a bluff." Saddam had invested considerable time and effort into developing international support for lifting the sanctions, and his efforts were paying dividends. If Saddam had no intent to use his forces, he sacrificed growing support in the vain hope that his military could provide the final impetus for a more rapid change in the UN position. If Saddam's intent was purely to gain the media spotlight by flexing his military might, there was a profound irony in his actions. Stories on two successive days in *The Washington Post* illustrate it. On 7 October (the day before Iraqi troop movements hit the front pages) a story said: "the United States is facing a serious, concerted challenge to its insistence on maintaining the United Nations economic sanctions." The next day the paper quoted Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN: "Every time lifting the sanctions comes up, the Iraqis do something to ensure that the sanctions will not be lifted."

The poor timing of the troop movements adds to the case against a show of force motive. A pure show of force would have made more sense *after* the UN listened to the UNSCOM report on 10 October and considered whether to move toward a time table for lifting sanctions. If the UN refused to ease sanctions, Saddam could have moved forward with the RGFC deployment. This would have preserved the potential benefits of a show of force without sacrificing the near-term goodwill of the UN and the world community.

Because the move came *before* the report, it seems more likely that he was positioning troops to use them to gain some greater leverage if the UNSCOM report did not bring progress towards lifting the sanctions. Although the possibility of irrational action cannot be eliminated, Saddam's troop movement was probably much more than empty saber rattling.

## 6. Preparing to Annex Kuwait Territory

Iraq's avarice for Kuwait goes back as far as Kuwaiti independence from Great Britain in 1961, but there is no evidence to show that Saddam Hussein intended to repeat the actions of August 1990. However, he, like outside observers, was capable of drawing lessons from the Gulf War. Saddam made four mistakes invading Kuwait: poor timing, swallowing Kuwait whole instead of just nibbling at its edges, moving troops toward the Saudi border, and miscalculating the world's response. A strategy that addressed the shortfalls of the 1990 attack would have been an attractive option for the Iraqi leader. Perhaps a bloodless occupation of a small, critical region of Kuwait would have given Saddam the bargaining chip he was looking for to ease the effects of the UN sanctions.

The effect of regional conditions on Saddam's power base supported action in the fall of 1994. The US had an important role in Arab-Israeli negotiations that were advancing rapidly. President Clinton announced on 24 July that "Jordan and Israel have agreed to continue vigorous negotiations to produce a treaty of peace. . .[and] to take immediate steps to normalize relations and resolve disputes in areas of common concern." In addition, US diplomatic efforts had moved Israel and Syria closer together, and movement toward an Israeli-PLO settlement continued. The Arab community was moving closer to Israel than it ever had before, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states declared that they would no longer enforce the secondary and tertiary aspects of the economic boycott against Israel, and would support a move in the Arab League to end the primary boycott. US actions in the region were eliminating one of Saddam's sources of legitimacy. Potential loss of the pan-Arab cause combined with the economic trouble brought on by the sanctions forced Saddam's dilemma to a climax. Saddam Hussein may have believed he had to muster nationalism and military power to restore the economy and stop progress in the Israeli peace process before it was too late.

	1990	1994
Air Force	539,000	426,000
Army	751,000	541,000
Marine Corps	197,000	174,000
Navy	582,000	469,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,069,000</b>	<b>1,611,000</b>

In some ways, the timing of a 1994 attack would have been better than that of 1990. Overall US force strength was substantially less than 1990 levels. Imminent US operations in Haiti and delicate negotiations with North Korea supported by US military deployments to South Korea made it reasonable for Saddam to believe the US had its hands full. Additionally, Saddam had reason to doubt US willingness to respond rapidly to a crisis. Republican members of Congress charged a lack of US international leadership, citing reductions in defense spending and a foreign policy of appeasement toward North Korea, China, Russia, and Haiti. According to one, "it is clear that Iraq and China have gotten the idea lately that they can flout the will of the international community and thumb their nose at the U.S. Why? Because that is precisely the message that the Clinton administration has been sending them for two years, that's why."

Although Iraqi forces were cut to about one-half their 1990 strength, the smaller force was still well suited to take and hold limited objectives such as the Rumaila oil field or Bubiyan Island. Saddam had the advantage of short supply lines—200 to 300 miles versus approximately 7000 miles for American units—and could deploy combat power to the Iraq-Kuwait border more rapidly than the US. By applying *salami tactics* against Kuwait while carefully avoiding a threatening posture

against Saudi Arabia, however, Saddam could have quickly moved into a position to gain international concessions. One may argue that the world would not have stood for such a move, but Saudi Arabia demonstrated during OVW that it had little interest in defending Kuwait. Saudi actions were tied to threats to Saudi Arabia. International opinion could have weighed hard against Saddam, as it did in 1990, but he had a good stack of diplomatic chips to play. Virtually all the demands of the various Gulf War UN resolutions remained unmet: giving up some of them along with some occupied territory would have provided an attractive basis for a negotiated settlement to a military fait accompli against the Rumaila oil field.

The Arab world and other international actors would have had reason to support such an offer. Saudi Arabia views Saddam Hussein as an external, controllable threat. The flow of Shiite fundamentalism, however, can threaten the Sunni monarchy of Saudi Arabia from within its borders. Any breakdown of control or fragmentation in Iraq is a greater threat to Saudi Arabia than a contrary, but stable Saddam Hussein. A unified Iraq also serves as a strategic buffer between the Arab world and the Persians of Iran. A negotiated settlement would allow reconciliation within the Arab world and avoid the extreme financial burden of military action to forcefully eject Iraqi troops. The parties who already favored lifting sanctions stood to benefit from a rapid resolution—even if it involved negotiations after a military occupation. The US would have undoubtedly condemned any agreement that rewarded aggression, but it had interests in keeping the Arab-Israeli peace process on track and was concerned with a host of other international and domestic concerns.

## 7. Conclusion

Saddam's propensity to resort to force even before exhausting other options and his isolation—both from his own advisors and the Western world—support the hypothesis that Iraq was attempting to influence the UN "by signaling it is prepared to resort to extreme measures if convinced it has nothing to gain from restraint." While the troop movement may have been only a *signal*, a bluff, an examination of the potential costs and benefits of the various mechanisms discussed leads one to believe that Iraq was ready to strike if the US failed to pass its test of resolve. Saddam could have easily believed he had little left to lose and that military action—if not quickly countered by a US response—offered a rapid way to gain concessions from the international community. The most compelling reason to believe Saddam intended to *use* his military force, however, is that if he did not plan to use it to take objectives, he assumed all the political risk of military operations but denied himself the potential benefits.

As the events of October 1994 unfolded, Saddam faced renewed unity in support of sanctions and lost all the gains he made during the previous summer. Successful conventional deterrence ensured the territorial integrity of Kuwait and denied Saddam the opportunity to gain a more favorable position in negotiations to lift the UN sanctions. Saddam's charm campaign was an alternative to military action, but it could not guarantee successful termination of the UN sanctions so Saddam was preparing to back it up with force. *Al-Thawraw*, the voice of the Baath Party, said on 7 October: "No matter what Iraq does, the United States will continue to make new demands . . . nobody will blame the people and leadership of Iraq if they undertake measures that will restore to the people their rights." US action eliminated the need to place *blame* for the *measures* Iraq was about to take. Conventional deterrence changed the course of action chosen by Saddam Hussein. The next chapter explains how.

### 1. Chapter 3

## 2. Operation Vigilant Warrior

*On October 10, as the first U.S. based aircraft began landing at airfields in the Persian Gulf and lead companies of the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division began moving into tactical assembly areas, Iraq announced the withdraw of reinforcing Republican Guard divisions . . . CENTCOM continued the flow of forces . . . the aircraft carrier USS George Washington . . . the USS Tripoli amphibious ready group . . . four Aegis cruisers . . . reinforcing Air Force squadrons with 275 aircraft . . . special operations forces . . . two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division . . . This impressive display of power projection achieved in days what had taken weeks during Desert Shield.*

General J. H. Binford Peay III

Commander-in-Chief USCENTCOM

When General Peay activated the CAT he tasked his planners to assess Saddam Hussein’s military moves and develop a course of action to deter Iraqi aggression or, failing that, to defend Kuwait against Iraqi attack. This chapter describes the development of the US response and how the speed of the US moves contributed to the Iraqi withdrawal. It examines the final US military and diplomatic solution to the problem. Finally, it discusses the importance of interagency coordination and public policy as applied to the rapid decision and execution processes of Vigilant Warrior. In the early morning hours of 6 October, the initial military response from USCENTCOM was the product of sound doctrine and deliberate planning.

Major Oppenheimer, the duty officer in the air operations division, says: "I pulled out my copy of *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide* and found a copy of the updated [Southwest Asia contingency] plan." As he went about the business of turning the CINC’s intent into a viable course of action, maritime and ground force planners accomplished similar tasks. The specifics of this scenario had not been anticipated, but the deliberate planning process provided a good starting point for the command’s response. As the CAT action officers busied themselves in the details of moving US forces, other planners above them examined the broader scope of US options. The discussion here, however, is limited to the operational level military action from USCENTCOM and how the theater planners responded to and coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Department of State, and the National Command Authority (NCA).

## 1. Force on Force

Planners at all levels were faced with a difficult task. Iraq normally had 50,000 troops in the vicinity of al-Basrah, near the Kuwaiti border. These forces were capable of offensive action but were normally employed maintaining civil order or conducting punitive raids against the Shiite marsh Arabs. The addition of two RGFC divisions, however, changed the force’s disposition from one of occupier to one of potential attacker. The previous chapter explained some possible motivations for what Saddam intended to do, but the military planners were not attempting to assess Iraqi intentions. Their perspective, from the Joint Staff down, was "we have to deal with what their capability is." Iraq’s capability, based on numerical strength and the efficiency demonstrated by the RGFC deployment, was substantial. The Iraqi force had moved quickly and the effort was very well organized

<p><b>Iraqi Forces Before October RGFC Movement</b></p>	<p><b>After October RGFC Movement</b></p>		<p><b>When USCENTCOM planners examined the threat they faced, time was not on their side. As they developed plans to move forces 7,000 miles into the theater of operations, Saddam Hussein was moving an additional division out of garrison toward the Kuwaiti border (Figure 3 shows a summary of the Iraqi buildup). The only ground forces in position to stop the</b></p>
---	---	--	---

Army Troops	50,000	71,000 (42% increase)
Tanks	650	1090 (68% increase)
Artillery Tubes	400	670 (68% increase)
APCs/IFVs	700	970 (39% increase)

Iraqis were four Kuwaiti brigades—two armor, one mechanized infantry, and one motorized cavalry. There was substantial coalition air presence in the area of responsibility (AOR), but it was there as a part of Operation Southern Watch. The aircraft were enforcing the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, and were not outfitted to stop an armor advance. US maritime presence in the AOR was more robust—five major combatant ships as well as the *USS Tripoli* Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The 2000 marines of the 15<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit, exercising in the United Arab Emirates, promptly ceased operations there and reembarked on the *Tripoli* ARG. The task of the CAT planners was straight forward—to get maximum combat power into the AOR as quickly as possible.

The aircraft carrier *USS George Washington* began moving from the Adriatic Sea to the Red Sea on Friday 7 October, and KC-

130 tankers were ordered to the AOR to support its 60 combat aircraft. Air reconnaissance assets (U-2s and RC-135s) also moved quickly to bring the picture of Saddam's action into a clear focus. They were followed on Sunday, 9 October, by the leading elements of the 24 Infantry Division (ID) from Fort Stewart, Georgia and two Patriot air defense missile batteries from Fort Polk, Louisiana. One brigade (58 Abrams tanks, 122 Bradley fighting vehicles, and 24 artillery pieces) of the 24th ID would joint up with prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and another (116 Abrams, 122 Bradleys, and 24 artillery) would meet twelve Afloat Prepositioning Force ships en route from Diego Garcia. I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) from Camp Pendleton, California sent an off-load preparation party to meet five Maritime Prepositioning Force ships from Diego Garcia, but the crisis ended before the MEF was deployed. The Air Force sent additional F-15C air superiority aircraft from the 1st Wing and A-10 and F-16C attack jets from the 23rd Wing. The initial Allied contribution to the force was the French destroyer *Georges Leygues* and two British ships: the frigate *HMS Cornwall* and the destroyer *HMS Cardiff*. Senior planners assembled this package quickly, and it was the only force moving when Saddam Hussein announced his intention to withdraw his forces from the Kuwaiti border on 10 October. US and coalition defenders in or on the way to the AOR had abundant capability—superior training, equipment, and doctrine—but they were greatly outnumbered by the 71,000 Iraqis they faced. The speed of the US response, more than the specific forces selected to deploy, was the primary source of US deterrent power.

## 2. The Essential Element of Time

Vigilant Warrior was "one of the quickest deployments of force in U.S. history" and its deterrent effect suggests that the speed should be considered as an explicit planning factor in deterrence response. Rapid coordination between USCENTCOM and higher echelons of commands made the quick response possible, and Vigilant Warrior's speed imposed unique restrictions on the planning staff, some of which were unfamiliar. US intelligence analysts discovered the Iraqi force movement on Wednesday, 5 October. By Friday US maritime forces were underway, and command authorities alerted major ground elements. By Monday, 1800 soldiers were on the ground in Kuwait. The headlines of *The Washington Post* tell a succinct story.

8 October	<b><i>Iraqi Troops Move Near Kuwait</i></b>
9 October	<b><i>U.S. Orders Missiles, 4,000 Troops to Gulf</i></b>
10 October	<b><i>36,000 U.S. Ground Troops Due in Gulf</i></b>
11 October	<b><i>Clinton Doubts Iraq's Word on Retreat</i></b>

The OVW experience contrasts starkly with the events that led to Desert Shield in 1990. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August (after many days of preparation), and the first US ground presence (units of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing and the 82nd Airborne Division) did not arrive in Saudi Arabia until 8 August. Many factors contributed to the faster 1994 response time. The dominant reason the US and coalition partners were able to move quickly is probably that *they had seen it all before*. The availability of the prepositioned brigade equipment set in Kuwait allowed a more rapid movement of mechanized forces, but lack of prepositioned stocks did not slow the 82nd Airborne in 1990. Another reason the 1994 deployment was

faster was that detailed plans were available and commanders were familiar with the theater infrastructure. Vigilant Warrior put greater combat power in the AOR more quickly, and it gave Saddam Hussein a face-saving way out of the crisis before the conflict escalated.

### 3. Follow-on Forces


On 10 October the Iraqi News Agency announced that *it had been decided* to move the Republican Guard units to other positions in the rear to *complete their scheduled training*. The decision came, they said, in light of the contacts Iraq had had with the world and the concern they have shown over the presence of units from the Republican Guard in al-Basrah. The US continued the deployment of a large force and began negotiating the passage of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) that would help prevent future Iraqi adventures. On the morning of 13 October the focus of operations was changing. General Peay stated: "The crisis is not past . . . we have defused the crisis, but we'll have to watch this situation very closely." The US had apparently deterred aggression, but it had been expensive, and there was no guarantee that Saddam would not repeat his actions after US troops returned home. The CINC's assessment that the crisis was not past was confirmed on the afternoon of 13 October when brigades of the al Nida division halted their northward movement near the city of An Nasiryah. This halt quelled any talk of canceling US force deployments into the AOR. The UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 949 on 15 October. It limited Iraqi military strength near the Kuwaiti border to those forces present before the RGFC movements. By 18 October, the al Nida was moving north again and on 20 October the NCA removed the 18,000 marines of the I MEF and 156,000 other personnel from deployment alert and canceled plans to move them. For those forces that did deploy (approximately 13,000 ground troops along with naval and air forces), USCENTCOM changed the focus of Vigilant Warrior to take advantage of the deployment exercise and seized an opportunity to practice combined operations with coalition partners.

### 4. The Diplomatic Instrument

While US troops were moving to Kuwait, the United States' diplomatic measures initially focused on coalition building. OVW presented planners with problems not generally associated with such a force buildup. "Access to the AOR was a major factor." Events were moving so quickly that coordination with host nations through the State Department was often a more limiting factor than was the readiness of troops or the availability of airlift. While most senior planners grew up in an era dominated by alliances such as NATO and SEATO, operations executed as a member of an ad hoc coalition require more interaction with diplomatic officials—a lot more. Team Spirit and Reforger exercise planners rarely had difficulties establishing overflight, landing, and basing rights: these were worked out in advance. In cases of impromptu coalition warfare, however, they must be negotiated in parallel with the development of military courses of action. This adds a new dimension to the complexity of crisis action planning.

After Saddam began to withdraw his forces, the US used the UN as a forum to prevent recurrence of a similar situation. The result of the US efforts was UNSCR 949, which established limits on the number and types of troops Iraq could deploy into southern Iraq. While still in its formative stages, it was referred to by the press as a *no-drive zone*, but it was more complicated than that. It demanded that "Iraq not redeploy to the South [military units recently deployed to southern Iraq] . . . or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq." To clarify their resolve, the US and Britain each sent separate but essentially identical *démarches* to Iraq on 20 October. They put Iraq on notice that they would "use military force to stop any new buildup of Iraqi troops south of the 32nd parallel." The *démarche* was the product of close coordination between USCENTCOM, the US Joint Staff, and the State Department. There were varying degrees of enthusiasm among USCENTCOM action officers about how much of a difference the line at the 32nd parallel would make in a combat situation where Iraqi armor was moving south. Irrespective of the tactical value, however, it increased US deterrent capacity by providing an unambiguous cartographic line and allowed the use of force before Iraqi units could enter Kuwait. Interagency coordination was important during the formulation of UNSCR 949 and the *démarche* that followed. It was equally important throughout OVW.

In spite of having little doctrinal guidance, OVW planners choose the proper forces and got them into theater quickly. The result was successful conventional deterrence. Their success was due to direct, early, and continuing involvement of senior leaders. Senior leaders could get things done more quickly than their lower echelon support staffs. The time savings were necessary for the operation's success, but they sometimes caused problems. "Handshakes by G.O.s [general officers] bypassed the staff and caused confusion . . . the audit trail of message traffic was broken." The staff was not always aware of the reasons behind changes to the plan—or even that changes in plans occurred, but the dynamic of diplomatic coordination made such adjustments a required part of planning.



"All six GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] ambassadors went into their governments and got approval for aircraft basing." US planners sometimes had to make changes to the aircraft types and locations for beddown to ease the concerns of host governments or to allow more efficient host nation support of operations. Diplomats went in on very short notice without detailed background information on the threat and the operation, but still accomplished their mission. This type of short notice coordination and rapid action is noteworthy because ambassadors only accepted instructions from The President through the Secretary of State. The flow of information shown in Figure 5 was critical to enable ambassadors to act in their official capacities as representatives of the US Head of State.

Informal communication also took place. The CINC's staff talked to the Joint Staff and in-country defense attaché officers, the USCENTCOM political advisor (POLAD) spoke to Assistant or Deputy Secretaries of State, and the CINC often spoke with the various ambassadors in the AOR. Planners used these channels to coordinate the details of official communication or clarify specific actions

necessary to implement formal policy. Informal communication paths were critical to link decision-makers with the details of policy. Diplomatic clearances for overflight or landing usually required two weeks to coordinate. Detailed flight information was necessary, but high level involvement was required to expedite the clearances. In Saudi Arabia, for example, personal approval from the Minister of Defense and Aviation was required for all flights into and over the kingdom. The teamwork between the military and the State



Department was a vital link in the success of Vigilant Warrior. Even more important, however, was the rapid *meeting of minds* between the CINC, the CJCS, the NCA, and the American public.

## 5. The Impact of Public Policy Statements

The crisis broke on Thursday afternoon, and on Saturday night the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense were in Florida at USCENTCOM headquarters listening to General Peay's assessment of the situation. They were coming back from Haiti and decided to stop before their return to Washington. General Peay outlined the command's plans and the Chairman recommended that the Secretary approve the CINC's assessment and response. The President approved the recommendation on Sunday morning. At 11:00 AM CNN correspondent Wolf Blitzer announced to the world (and to USCINCCENT) that a major US force deployment would begin in response to the Iraqi situation. The CJCS telephoned the CINC with the same news 45 minutes later. The next morning Iraq announced it would move the Republican Guards north. Edward Fugit, the USCENTCOM political advisor, said that Saddam "was deterred, I believe, by the public policy of President Clinton." The public policy statement greatly contributed to the time compression of the crisis. A diplomatic message, delivered through a third party, might have taken days to reach the Iraqi government. It would have wasted time, wasted deterrence. The boldness of the declaratory policy matched the boldness of the military response. President Clinton, with one action, committed himself to the American public and committed the US to its allies, the coalition, and the world community. He also sent the clearest possible message directly to the Iraqi government, and the Iraqis' penchant for watching CNN ensured they heard him loud and clear.

One might imagine the decision to commit large numbers of US ground forces would take time for analysis, development of alternative options, and debate over the various merits of each. The presidential decision came rapidly, however, because of the domestic political environment and the previous attack by the Iraqi dictator. Mr. Fugit called it "a win-win situation. No one wanted to just talk." Even then Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, who vehemently opposed US action in Haiti, fully supported the President. While France, China, and Russia would have called for moderation in private talks, they were forced to accept the US decision in total, or oppose it by supporting Iraq. All chose the former, but with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Even though future crises may rarely present the president with such a clear mandate to act, it is important to explore the expanded use of public policy statements in conjunction with conventional deterrence. It is also important to note that, having once demonstrated such a rapid response, a slower response to a developing crisis may be viewed as a lack of commitment. The next chapter examines conventional deterrence doctrine and theory to tie the lessons of OVW into a broader framework.

### 1. Chapter 4

## 3. Deterrence Theory and Doctrine

*There is a well know distinction between deterrence based on punishment, which involves threatening to destroy large portions of an opponent's population and industry, and deterrence based on denial, which requires convincing an opponent that he will not attain his goals on the battlefield.*

—John J. Mearsheimer

*Conventional Deterrence*

This *well known* distinction between the mechanisms of punishment and denial is not adequately reflected in United States military doctrine. US deterrence doctrine is steeped in nearly 50 years of punishment-based nuclear strategy. So deep is the link between deterrence and nuclear weapons that a reader rarely finds one mentioned without the other. This chapter argues that deterrence is not merely the realm of nuclear weapons and punishment. Punishment *and* denial are important aspects of deterrence theory and effective conventional deterrence must rely on both mechanisms.

The first section of this chapter provides a brief review of deterrence theory and defines the terms used later in the argument; this frames subsequent discussion in a broader theoretic context and bounds the specific deterrence lessons of Vigilant Warrior. The next part expands the theoretical discussion, presents the USCENTCOM model used in the formulation of the OVW response, and provides a brief review of recent updates to US conventional deterrence doctrine. The chapter concludes with the presentation of a deterrence model based on the disaggregation of capability and will into more descriptive components: power, agility, intent, and resolve.

## 1. Deterrence in a Changing Context

Many basic US deterrence policy choices were made in the 1950s, before the detailed theoretical analysis that supports today's deterrence theory. Bernard Brodie related nuclear strategy to the supremacy of offensive airpower asserted by Giulio Douhet in 1921. In 1961, Snyder proposed that deterrence forces prevent attack, while defense forces mitigate the effects of attacks that can not be deterred. The rise of airpower, the appearance of nuclear weapons, and post W.W. II economic policy led the US to choose between deterrence and defense forces. More and more, deterrence became associated with nuclear forces. During the same period, some theorists viewed deterrence as synonymous with the threat of punishment; the denial aspect withered. "To fight back when attacked is one kind of response, but to reach out and harm the attacker in retribution is another—and it is the later that is most closely associated with deterrence."

Many theorists did not abandon the denial aspect of deterrence theory, and the trend in declared US nuclear deterrence doctrine—assured destruction, massive retaliation, flexible response, limited nuclear options—*seemed* to rely increasingly on denial. This, however, was not done in the interests of increasing the direct deterrent value of nuclear forces. The reason for the change was to give the president more options in crisis situations (escalation dominance)—credible and moral options that might help terminate nuclear conflicts if deterrence *failed*. Stephen Cimbala argues that neither the punishment nor the denial mechanisms of nuclear deterrence were as significant as the uncertainty of nuclear war because "neither side could guarantee control over subsequent escalation once first use had been authorized." In spite of war plans that favor counterforce targets (a trend that goes back to the early 1950s), the reality of nuclear deterrence remains mutual assured destruction because the overwhelming destructive power of nuclear weapons will inflict intolerable punishment irrespective of the targeting scheme used in their application.

The cold war view of deterrence focused primarily on avoiding general war with the Soviet Union. It succeeded. Today's strategic environment, however, demands an expansion of earlier doctrine to solve some of the problems that were previously overshadowed or suppressed by superpower competition. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, the balance between the superpowers was a primary force of both stability and change in the third world. While protégé states often engaged in military actions against neighbors, their superpower sponsors managed the scope and level of the violence. Today, effective conventional deterrence can be a valuable substitute for the stability previously provided by the bipolar balance.

## 2. Deterrence Defined

The dictionary defines deterrence as the act or process of turning aside, discouraging, or preventing action. This definition does not specify the mechanism for implementation but does address the idea of "using vast military power and weaponry in order to discourage war." The rise of airpower before World War II popularized the idea of using pain and punishment to deter aggression or coerce an adversary. After the war, a variety of factors expanded the association between punishment and deterrence and minimized reliance on the denial mechanism. That legacy remains today.

Joint doctrine defines deterrence as: "The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counter action." The joint definition addresses only one part of the deterrence issue—the fear of consequences (punishment). It implies whatever gains the attacker has planned may not be forcibly prevented, but that the consequences of achieving those gains will be so undesirable that the punishment will inhibit the action. Vigilant Warrior suggests that joint practitioners of the operational arts understand the denial mechanism as well as punishment, but the doctrine must catch up with their practice. Doctrine should be a codified body of ideas and practices, not an informal or ad hoc set of verbal traditions. Parallels to the broader discussion now contained in Joint Pub 3-07 need to propagate through other joint publications. Additionally, the Air Force must modernize its view of deterrence to account for the expanded role of conventional deterrence; the discussion in Navy Doctrine Publication 1 provides a good beginning and could be used to supplement the discussion in Air Force Manual 1-1.

An important foundation for the expansion of joint deterrence doctrine is common terminology. The remainder of this chapter relies on the following definitions.

**Deterrence:** The process of preventing action through denial of potential gains, the imposition of excessive costs, and the prospect of other unacceptable counter action.

**Direct Deterrence:** Deterrence to discourage attack against one’s own territory.

**Extended Deterrence:** Deterrence to discourage attack against allies, coalition partners, or other national interests.

**General Deterrence:** Deterrence applied in the context of general political and military competition in which the possibility of conflict is present but neither party is actively engaging in military confrontation.

**Immediate Deterrence:** Deterrence applied to specific cases where aggressors are actively considering military operations, the deterring state is aware of the threat, and the deterring military forces are preparing a response to the potential attack.

		<i>Threat Posed by Attacker</i>	
		Actual	Potential
<i>Target of</i>	Defender	Direct-Immediate Deterrence (France-Germany 1940)	Direct-General Deterrence (USSR-China 1970s)

**Figure 6: Types of Deterrence**

The typology of deterrence is important because it illustrates one of the limitations of deterrence theory—the tendency to over-generalize. Separating different deterrent goals helps to mitigate this problem. While many aspects remain nearly constant, each of the deterrence *flavors* shown in Figure 6 requires unique consideration. The formula for successful deterrence (if a formula is possible) will be distinct in each case because of the different contextual elements. Although some broader application may be possible, the following sections apply the analysis and lessons of OVW only to the

<i>Attack</i>	Protégé of Defender	Extended-Immediate Deterrence  (Operation Vigilant Warrior)	Extended-General Deterrence  (US and Korea since 1953)
---------------	---------------------------	--	--

realm of extended-immediate deterrence. To properly understand the deterrence lessons of OVW, however, it is first necessary to review some general assumptions, criticisms, and limitation of deterrence theory. Some of these ideas are specifically relevant to Vigilant Warrior, but all are important to the deductive application of particular lessons to future deterrence situations.

"Deterrence is about *intentions*—not just estimating enemy intentions but *influencing* them." Also, it rests on the bedrock of the status quo because it inhibits action. When revisionist actors contemplate using military force, they embark on a rational, value maximizing decision process. If the expected benefits of the contemplated action exceed the expected costs, the aggressor is likely to attack. Typically, the calculus of deterrence is presented in a binary form—the target state and its defender either respond or do not. If the probability of response times the costs to the attacker is greater than probability of no response times the expected benefits, the attacker is deterred. The binary approach may be sufficient to model nuclear deterrence, but it fails to account for the broad range of possible responses by the target state and its sponsor (hereafter referred to as a unitary defender). In the more general case, four variables describe the expected utility of attack:

1. The value of the war objectives—the expected benefits to the aggressor (including overcoming any negative utility of the status quo)
2. The costs—those the defender imposes by resistance (denial) and counter action (punishment) as well as costs that are independent of defender action
3. The probabilities of the defender's various responses—the chances of incurring costs
4. The possibility of achieving the war objectives given each possible response—the chances of accruing benefits


These four variables form a family of decision equations. By designing complementary responses that span a broad range of intensity, the defender can be prepared to better deter a wider range of challenges to the status quo. Whereas punishment affects only the cost side of the equations, denial affects the benefits side as well. The theory that began simply, however, continues to become more complex.

Deterrence is a two-way proposition. While the defender is contemplating how to deter action by the attacker, the attacker is examining the benefits and costs associated with defender action. If the defender has little to gain by maintaining the status quo, little to lose by its revision, or will incur disproportionate costs by preventing change, the attacker is likely to assume a low probability of action by the defender. Deterrence in this case can still be successful, however, if the low probability of action is tied to extreme penalty (as in the case of nuclear retaliation). In conventional deterrence it is more difficult to pose a credible threat of extreme penalty. Therefore, the perception of strong commitment by the defender is more important in conventional deterrence than in nuclear deterrence. This task, by the defender, is particularly difficult in cases of extended-immediate deterrence. There are two primary causes for this: the defender's territory is not at risk (only the protégé is at risk) and general deterrence has failed in some measure or was not attempted (or the immediate challenge would not be present). In such cases, the defender must work hard to reinforce or establish the perception of commitment.

Genuine commitment is a necessary foundation upon which to build a perception in the attacker's mind, but it is not sufficient—the defender must *communicate* commitment through credible declaration and action. But even given declaration and action, there are significant barriers that may inhibit establishing the desired perception in the attacker's mind. The attacker's expectations and immediate concerns affect his ability to assimilate new information. Many opinions and value judgments are based on individual experience rather than the broader context of history. Even given a clear history of reinforcing information, actions taken by the defender can be seen as escalatory rather than defensive. This may move the attacker

closer to action than conciliation. Therefore, to form an effective deterrent response, the defender must be familiar with the attacker's view of the world and understand the attacker's value preferences.

Deterrence assumes rational decisions. This often seems to limit the theory's value. The limitation, however, is more frequently found in the application than in the theory itself. Rationality is the ability to order one's preferences and choose courses of action according to the ranking and perceived likelihood of the various outcomes. "The assumption of rationality does not require that perceptions be accurate, or that a given decision-maker's preferences be the same as other people's." It may be impossible to understand all the decision-maker's preferences or perceptions, but attempting to do so is a critical step in the intelligence process required to support successful deterrence. Neglecting the difficult task of modeling the adversary's preferences and the factors affecting his rationality cannot be replaced by projecting one's own values and procedures on to the adversary. Doing so is a fault of deterrence practice rather than a shortfall of theory. It may also be a fault of practice to assume a single decision-maker. State policy may be the product of a decision process, a locus of power, or bureaucratic implementation. Learning about the decision-makers is as important as learning about the military instruments at their disposal. It may be impossible to predict specific actions, but one must develop an understanding of the basic motivations behind a range of possible actions.



Deterrence is a process—a process based on assumptions, knowledge, and decisions. It is a reactive enterprise that takes shape based on the actions, values, capabilities, and perceptions of two opposing parties. Alexander George and Richard Smoke provide a useful flow chart that traces the process of deterrence (see Figure 7). The preceding review of deterrence theory is a superset of the model used by USCENTCOM planners during OVW. The practical decisions USCENTCOM planners made were not, by and large, based on the application of abstract theory. It is useful, however, to use this broad theoretical base as an assessment and evaluation tool. Doctrine should be supported by established theory, and the theory should be validated by experience.

## 1. Deterrence in Vigilant Warrior

The force mix and prioritization for movement in Vigilant Warrior were based on an expectation model for effective deterrence. Available forces, domestic politics,

international diplomacy, and economic issues affected the implementation of that model. This section explains how the USCENTCOM planners viewed deterrence and how they transformed those ideas into action. The USCENTCOM model is simple, usable, and applicable to immediate-extended deterrence. The model states that successful deterrence is expected given sufficient **capability**, **willingness to use force**, and **resolve** on the part of the defender.

**Capability** is the demonstrated and perceived ability to use combat forces to achieve the desired military effects. The desired effects include both punishment and denial. Air and maritime forces were first in theater during OVW. Saddam's previous experience with US

airpower ensured a clear perception of its effects. Initial forces had little denial capability but could apply immediate punishment. Referring to the first ships on the scene, Lt. Gen. Sheehan, the Joint Staff Operations Director, said: "This gives us the capability of having over 200 TLAM [tactical land attack] missiles that can reach downtown Baghdad." This statement reinforced the perception of capability and it also demonstrated the willingness to use that capability. The prospect of punishment, however, still left Saddam with many options to reassert or modify his challenge (see Fig. 7). The early movement of land forces (the 24th ID) and air forces (the 23rd Wing) capable of stopping an armor advance provided the means to deny territorial gains. Forces deployed to the central region during OVW provided a balanced capability both to deny the benefits of attack and to punish the attacker for his actions. Force movement alone, however, may not be sufficient to demonstrate the will to put those forces in combat unless the forces are deployed to make engagement inevitable—a tripwire.

Deterrence is often characterized by combining capability and credibility. In the nuclear context, this means having the means to deliver and the will to order a punitive strike. This is an insufficient model to represent the dynamics of the conventional deterrence process. The defending state must not only act, it must continue to act to see conflict through to resolution. Therefore, USCENTCOM treated intent and resolve as separate components of credibility.

**Intent** is the demonstration and perception of the defender's mettle. The attacker must believe the defender is willing to pay the physical, political, and economic price of combat or other deterrent acts. Intent is revealed by both the actions and the declarations of the defender. Since the Korean War, the military has been primarily concerned with action, while declarations of intent came from political and diplomatic sources. Today, the ubiquity of broadcast media has blurred those lines. Vigilant Warrior was an excellent example of effective coordination of the political, diplomatic, and military declaration of intent. The military, primarily at the national level, aggressively pushed its message into the international spotlight. Beyond declarations, however, action in the form of troop movements and combat preparations demonstrate the intent to fight. The previous chapter described the forces that moved during Vigilant Warrior; the US also notified and prepared a much larger force. Speaking on 11 October the CJCS said: "We have in theater, some 19,000. We have in various stages of deployment and planned-for deployment an additional 44,500. And we have on alert, but not yet in any particular form of movement, and additional 156,000." This secondary force may have helped demonstrate intent to use the primary forces.

**Resolve** is the demonstration and perception of the state's commitment to long-term action and final settlement of the conflict. Involvement of the United States in Vietnam and Somalia and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are examples where great powers had sufficient intent but limited resolve. The attacker's motivations may be more enduring than those of the defender. If this is the case, the attacker can simply wait for a more suitable opportunity to implement his plans or wear down the defender over time. Saddam's performance during Desert Storm air operations reinforces the thesis that he doubted US resolve even though evidence of the US *intent to fight* was falling all over Iraq. Early commitment of US ground troops to OVW demonstrated resolve because America has been slow to commit ground troops to battle without first attempting to use airpower and naval strength to gain the desired effects. Ground troops demonstrated, from the outset of Vigilant Warrior, that the US was committed to sustained operations to achieve decisive results. By promptly deploying a large ground contingent, the administration demonstrated its willingness to assume the economic cost and political commitment necessary to resolve Saddam's threat to Kuwait.

In the specific case of Vigilant Warrior, the author believes the resolve demonstrated by land forces was decisive. Air and naval forces also are capable of demonstrating resolve, but the mechanism is different from that of land forces. Land forces demonstrate resolve because they are economically and politically expensive—they show that the US cares enough to spend blood and treasure. Air and naval forces show resolve because they are cheap—inherent in them is the feasibility of long-term presence, the ability to win the waiting

game. The low risk of casualties and lower cost of long deployments allow long-term commitment of air and naval forces. Its light footprint gives airpower a large amount of combat power for a relatively small deployed force. This decreases deployment expenses and allows long-term presence (24 A-10s remain at Al Jaber AB, Kuwait as of this writing). Airpower also imposes low political burdens on host nations; if cultural sensitivities are involved, as in the case of the Persian Gulf region, this is particularly important. While naval power cannot bring as much force to bear over an extended period as land-based airpower, naval power is virtually unrestricted by host nation sensitivities. Such sensitivities not only affect the basing options for Air Force assets, they can also affect employment options. Low economic burden and low political cost are italicized in Figure 8 because, in the specific case of OVW, these characteristics probably were not decisive. Land, maritime, and air forces have complementary deterrent characteristics. The appropriate mix is dependent on the adversary's perception of each element of the joint force.

Individual officers (working within a single component) did not always see the pattern of deterrent strategy behind Vigilant Warrior. They were each tasked to get as much force into theater as quickly as they could. Senior planners, however, deliberately chose the force mix and prioritized its movement. The result of this strategy was a force that could both deny Saddam the expected benefits of military action and deliver punitive strikes in response to an attack. The force mix showed US immediate intent and long-term resolve. Each component demonstrated its strengths and the judicious combination of those contributions prepared USCENTCOM forces for "multidimensional warfare, a key to conventional deterrence."

		<i>Contribution to Deterrence</i>		
		Capability	Intent	Resolve
<i>Functional</i>	Air (Air Force and Navy)	Punishment Denial	Rapid Response	<i>Low Economic Burden</i>
<i>Component</i>	Naval (TLAM)	Punishment	Rapid Response	<i>Low Political Cost</i>
	Land (Army and Marine)	Denial	Commitment	High Cost

## 2. Joint Deterrence Doctrine

Joint doctrine does not comprehensively and consistently address the nature, types, and mechanisms of conventional deterrence. The most recent Joint Pub 1-02 still makes no explicit mention of deterrence by denial. Yet, as early as 1990, the test version of Joint Pub 3-0 indirectly defined deterrence, saying:

Proper preparation for war contributes to deterrence by convincing adversaries that their costs will be unacceptable or their chances of success will be minimal. War is deterred when an adversary judges that the objective to be obtained is not worth the perceived cost and there is little likelihood of success.

The doctrine, however, appears to account only for general deterrence when it says: "Although focused on deterrence, CINCs will occasionally be required to respond to a crisis or confrontation." In the summary, it acknowledges no role for immediate deterrence. "Unified operations in peacetime are designed to deter war and, should deterrence fail, permit rapid, effective response to crises or transition to war." The implication that crises occur because deterrence has failed is valid, but the assumption that one should then move directly to a combat mentality is flawed. General deterrence has failed. But if the intent of crisis resolution is achieving diplomatic objectives while avoiding war, one must acknowledge immediate deterrence and develop crisis strategy based on warfighting as well as

deterrence principles. The argument of this study is that *rapid and effective response to crises* is extended immediate deterrence, and that doctrinal guidance—how one achieves successful extended immediate deterrence—must be more explicit.

The latest version of Joint Pub 3-0 contains only indirect reference to deterrence, but a significant discussion was added to Joint Pub 3-07. The latest discussion in 3-07 is a significant expansion of the information previous contained in 3-0. Along with deterrence, it addresses forward presence and crisis response as instruments that are available to attain national security objectives in military operations other than war. It goes on to explain that forward presence demonstrates commitment and credibility and provides initial combat capability in crises. It also notes that the ability to respond rapidly is an important aspect of crisis response. But it ends there.

While doctrine should not evolve into an academic treatise, it must do more than categorize the mechanisms available to achieve the desired ends. It should also explain those mechanisms, identify limiting factors, and predict results. The USCENTCOM model expanded the binary view of deterrence (capability and credibility) into three factors (capability, intent, and resolve) by disaggregating the credibility aspect of deterrence. The model presented below uses the lessons of Vigilant Warrior to go one step further; it also separates capability in to aggregate components of power and agility.

### **3. The Value of Agility**

One of the most striking characteristics of Vigilant Warrior was the speed of US action. The crisis that spawned OVW began on 5 October 1994 and was winding down by the time the operation was named on 10 October. Although Vigilant Warrior did not officially conclude until 22 December 1994, the main effect after 20 October was directed toward strengthening general deterrence. Many aspects of OVW facilitated a rapid US response. Regional stability was critical to US long-term interests. From 1990 to 1994, the conflict between the US and Iraq was never far from the headlines; the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons development, attacks on Kurds in the North and Shiites in the South, Iraqi sponsorship of an assassination attempt on former President Bush, and ongoing concern of unexplained health problems experienced by Gulf War veterans kept Americans interested in Saddam Hussein's activities. Human rights violations and weapons of mass destruction programs were particularly vexing to both the US and the world community as represented by the United Nations. Finally, the pattern of action by Iraq in 1994 closely resembled what it did before its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. These factors combined to form a broad base of public and governmental support for decisive action against Iraq. Strong US commitment to support Kuwait and oppose Iraq clearly mandated immediate action. The thesis of this section is that the corollary may also be true. That is, immediacy appears to be an indicator of commitment and dilatoriness is a sign of vacillation. Most deterrence theory does not address the concept of timing as an independent variable affecting the deterrent outcome, and joint doctrine views rapid response as a preparatory mechanism for combat more than a deterrent mechanism. This may be due to scholars assuming rapid responses from strategic nuclear forces or uniform mobilization times for military forces, and the US doctrinal assumption that US forces would begin combat operations from a defensive position after a failure of general deterrence. Time is an intuitively obvious factor in conventional deterrence, but it has generally escaped serious analysis in cases of effective or failed deterrence.

The following argument does not attempt to make an empirical case for agility; rather, it uses a deductive approach to trace the logic of including agility as an element deterrence doctrine. Agility influences other facets of deterrence. Agility's most obvious impact is on capability. Quickly initiating an extended deterrent response allows more time to build up forces in the region being challenged. The application of strategic airlift, prepositioned materiel, and fast sealift has magnified the impact of the time it takes the US to decide to act. Before these approaches, long mobilization times gave decision-makers more to time debate policy options. Today, because transit times




have decreased, any lengthening of the decision process has a proportionately greater negative impact on the build up of theater forces. The decision process also has impact on the adversary's perception of intent and resolve.

If there is a serious challenge to American interest today, the world expects to turn on the news and see video clips of US forces boarding aircraft and heading to the hot spot du jour. US policymakers took advantage of this to make OVW more effective. This capability, however, brings with it an expectation. If the adversaries do not see a response, they may assume either that their provocative actions have not yet been detected, or that the US has insufficient interest to respond. If the world media have discovered the challenge and policymakers are still deciding what to do about it, every moment they delay reinforces the perception that the US is not committed. That initial perception may then make it more difficult to demonstrate US intent and resolve as the crisis progresses.

Agility improves the impact of denial and punishment mechanisms. John Mearsheimer argues in *Conventional Deterrence* that deterrence is weakened if the attacker believes he can effectively carry out a blitzkrieg attack or a limited aims strategy. Both these strategies are more likely to be negated if combat power reaches the theater rapidly. Either the attacker is faced with a battle of attrition, or the forces can be in place before an aggressor can mount a successful surprise attack. Agility also improves the punishment mechanism because it helps avoid delays in retaliation that give the attacker an opportunity to undermine support for punitive measures. If response is not rapid, the attacker has time to appeal to the international community for outside mediation in the name of a *peaceful* settlement. The punishment mechanism is especially dependent on agility when the attacker pursues a limited aims strategy. If the aggressor state believes it can consolidate military gains and effectively appeal to diplomatic agencies then the perceived costs of the attack are reduced. It is important to remember that while US planners may *know* that American political will would support delayed punitive measures, effective deterrence depends on what the attacker believes.

#### 4. PAIR Deterrence Model



The PAIR model of extended immediate deterrence provides a structural framework for analyzing deterrence options in crisis action planning. Flexible deterrence options can be broken down and compared by examining the capabilities of the forces involved (power and agility) and how they demonstrate US commitment to the crisis (intent and resolve). These four factors are anchored to general deterrence because understanding its previous successes, its limits, and the possible reasons behind its failure can promote more effective immediate deterrence. All this rests on a foundation of the adversary's perceptions and rationality.

The adversary's perceptions and the rational decision process that uses those perceptions to generate alternatives and select courses of action are the basis for all deterrence. This can lead to divergence between deterrence strategy and warfighting strategy. The two will not necessarily be different or at odds with one another, but if the adversary's perception and rationality are substantially different than our own, deterrence based on preparation for combat may fail. Even if the combat strategy is effective and may lead to victory on the objective battlefield, it may fail to

deter war in the subjective arena of the adversary's mind. Crisis action planners must understand this difference. The combat strategy may be the dominant factor in choosing a crisis response, especially if the cost of immediate deterrence failure is great. However, in cases where campaign plans are equivalent in their military effects, but approach the adversary from different strategic directions, the plan that is most threatening to the adversary's strategy will likely be the more successful deterrent.

While there is considerable overlap between them, it is important to understand the differences between general and immediate deterrence. If general deterrence is not pursued, it does not negate the possibility of effective immediate deterrence, but it has substantial impact. In 1990 the US had no effective general deterrence strategy to contain Iraqi expansion. When Iraq moved toward Kuwait the US reacted from a nearly flat-footed stance. Immediate deterrence failed in 1990 but was successful in 1994. After the Gulf War, the United States attempted to maintain the coalition that defeated Saddam Hussein. That coalition, combined with allies and the international community, provided a basis for the rapid, coordinated, large-scale response that deterred Iraq in *Vigilant Warrior*. The speed, unity, and size of the 1994 response were not possible in 1990. A general deterrence strategy provides the intellectual (knowing the adversary and planning for contingencies), political (setting policy), and physical (prepositioning stocks, securing basing rights, and exercising interoperability) infrastructure that makes more effective immediate deterrence possible.

One may argue that the distinction between general and immediate deterrence is not required. However, that would deny the potential benefits gained by separating the two and tailoring deterrent actions to meet the specific demands of each. Declaring failure and abandoning deterrence principles during crisis situations puts US forces on a more direct path to war. If victory in war is the only objective—and *once war is inevitable* it is—the idea of immediate versus general deterrence has little value. However, if one believes the purpose of crisis response is to avoid as well as to prepare for war, then the principle of immediate deterrence is a necessary concept.

Power, agility, intent, and resolve measure the value of the forces and strategy used to achieve successful conventional deterrence. The proper balance of these four deterrence components allows them to complement one another to form the best flexible deterrent options given the available resources. Absence or undue sacrifice of one of these components in favor of the others can jeopardize an entire deterrent strategy.

**Power** is the ability to deny military gains by the adversary, increase the costs of gains, or deliver punishing attacks in response to those gains. Increased combat power often comes at the expense of decreased agility.

**Agility** is the speed with which forces can deliver combat power. Agility considers the time it takes for forces to be deployed into theater as well as the value of forces that can deliver combat power directly from bases outside the theater. Agility balances the value of an immediate, but possibly less powerful response, against a delayed response. It can also help compensate for decreased forward presence.

**Intent** is the defender's commitment to employ combat power. It is demonstrated by the types of forces available, their disposition, and the costs of using them relative to the value of the defended objectives. Declaratory policy is a necessary supplement to the intent demonstrated by deploying forces or preparing out of theater forces for combat operations.

**Resolve** is the defender's commitment to long-term action and the final settlement of the crisis. Forces demonstrate resolve through varying mechanisms. Air and maritime forces make long-term presence feasible and economical. Land forces demonstrate the willingness to escalate to reach a final settlement in spite of high political and economic costs. Political action, public statements, as well as economic, historical, and cultural ties to the defended state are important parts of demonstrating resolve.

## 5. Conclusion

Immediate deterrence should rest on a foundation of general deterrence. If that foundation is not present, immediate deterrence is possible, but more difficult to implement. Immediate deterrence is supported by military forces and policy. Forces should be capable and agile. Grand strategic policy should be steadfast in its goals but agile in its application—decision-makers must act quickly. Agile forces exploit rapid policy decisions to increase the capability to deny and punish the attacker. Policy agility declares intent early and quickly adapts actions to counter modifications to the attacker's challenges.

The PAIR model is a fusion of previous theoretical propositions and lessons from the practical application of deterrence in OVW. The author presents it as a starting point for expansion of US conventional deterrence doctrine. The next chapter addresses some of the implications of the proposed doctrine and suggests ways to further verify it and test its validity.

## 1. Selected Bibliography

### Books, Published Papers, and Journal Articles

Ahrari, M. E., and James H. Noyes, eds. *The Persian Gulf After the Cold War*. Westport: Praeger, 1993.

Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision*. Harper Collins Publishers, 1971.

Alnasrawi, Abbas. *Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of Dependency*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Bergquist, Ronald E. *The Role of Airpower in the Iran-Iraq War*. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1988.

Betts, Richard K. "Wealth, Power, and Instability." *International Security* 18 (Winter 1993/94): 33-77

Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. 1st paperback ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_, ed. *The Future of Deterrence in U.S. Strategy*. Los Angeles: Security Studies Project, 1968.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. *War and Reason*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Cady, Steven E. *The Country Team*. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1992.

Cimbala, Stephen J. "Proliferation and Peace: An Agnostic View." *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (Winter 1995/96): 211-233.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Force and Diplomacy in the Future*. New York: Praeger, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Military Persuasion*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Strategic Impasse*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

\_\_\_\_\_, ed. *Challenges to Deterrence*. New York: Praeger, 1987.

Collins, John M. "Principles of Deterrence." *Air University Review* 16 (November-December 1979): 17-26.

Combs, Jerald A. "The Compromise That Never Was: George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and the Issue of Conventional Deterrence in Europe, 1949-1952." *Diplomatic History* 15 (Summer 1991): 361-386.

Desch, Michael C. "The Keys that Lock Up the World." *International Security* 14 (Summer 1989): 86-121.

Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I" *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983): 205-235.

*EIU Country Report, Iraq, 4th Quarter 1994*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 15 November 1994

*Facts on File 54* (13 October 1994): 745-746.

*Facts on File 54* (27 October 1994): 789-810.

Finnie, David H. *Shifting Lines in the Sand*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Gause, F. Gregory III. *Oil Monarchies*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994.

George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

George, Alexander L., and William E. Simons, eds. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 2d ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Givhan, Walter D. *The Time Value of Military Force in Modern Warfare*. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996.

Gutertner, Gary L. *Deterrence and Defense in a Post-Nuclear World*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Haley, P. Edward. "Saddam Surprises the United States: Learning from 'The Revolution of August 2.'" *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (Winter 1995/96): 159-185.

Hallion, Richard P. *Storm over Iraq*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

Hartmann, Frederick H., and Robert L. Wendzel. *America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994.

Howard, Michael. "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s." *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Winter 1982/83): 309-324.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Huth, Paul K. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. "What Makes Deterrence Work?" *World Politics* 36 (July 1984): 496-526.

Ibrajim, Ibrahim, ed. *The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences*. Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1992.

Jervis, Robert. "Deterrence Theory Revisited." *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 289-324.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Deterrence and Perception*. Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1982.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985.

Johnson, Stuart, and Martin Labicki, eds. *Dominant Battlespace Awareness*, with Introduction by Admiral William A. Owens. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995.

Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Rautsi. *Saddam Hussein*. New York: Free Press,

1991.

*Keesing's Record of World Events* 40 (October 1994): 40255

Lauterpacht, E. CBE, QC, C. J. Greenwood, Marc Weller and Daniel Bethkehem, eds. *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1991.

Liddell Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. New York: Meridian, 1991.

Marr, Phebe. "Gulf Security and Iraq's Uncertain Future." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 9 (Autumn 1995): 50-54.

Mearsheimer, John J. *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Miller, Steven E., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, eds. *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.

Misch, Fredrick C., ed. *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*. Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1986.

Morgan, Patrick M. *Deterrence. Sage Library of Social Research*, Vol. 40. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and William A. Owens. "America's Information Edge." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March/April 1996): 20-36.

Peay, J. H. Binford III. "The Five Pillars of Peace in the Central Region." *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 9 (Autumn 1995): 32-39.

Peretz, Don. *The Middle East Today*. 6th ed. Westport: Praeger, 1994.

Quester, Georger H. *Deterrence Before Hiroshima*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966.

Quester, Georger H., and Victor A. Utgoff. "No-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining Extended Deterrence." *Washington Quarterly* 17 (Spring 1994): 103-114.

Ra'anan, Uri, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds. *Projection of Power*. Hamden: Shoe String Press, Inc., 1982.

Rezun, Miron. *Intrigue and War in Southwest Asia*. New York: Preager, 1992.

Reed, Robert H. "On Deterrence." *Air University Review* 16 (May-June 1975): 2-17.

Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Sciolino Elaine. *The Outlaw State*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991.

Snyder, Glenn H. *Deterrence and Defense*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Tachau, Frank. ed. *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing. *Conflict Among Nations*. Princeton:



Princeton University Press, 1977.

Van Evera, Stephen. "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13 (June 1990): 1-51.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Case for Finite Containment." *International Security* 14 (Summer 1989): 5-49.

### **Magazine and Newspaper Articles**

Ajami, Fouad. "Hosing Down the Gulf's Arsonist." *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 October 1994, 48.

"An Easing Off in Iraq . . ." *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A16.

"Armed Forces Manpower Trends." *Air Force Magazine*, May 1995, 37.

Birnbaum, Jeffrey H., and Robert S. Greenberger. "U.S. Dispatches More Aircraft To Persian Gulf." *Wall Street Journal*, 11 October 1994, A3.

Boustany, Nora. "Iraqi Bid for Arab Unity Failed." *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "This Time, Saddam Is No Hero in Palestinian Camps." *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A1.

Brown, David. "Christopher Says Saddam has 'Been Put on Notice.'" *Washington Post*, 17 October 1994, A11.

Corliss, Richard. "Saddam Again." *Time*, 17 October 1994, 54.

Crossette, Barbara. "Iraq's Attempt to Have Sanctions Lifted Quickly May Have Backfired." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994. A13.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Russia and Iraq Work Out Plan to Ease Gulf Tension." *New York Times*, 13 October 1994. A16.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Iraqis to Accept Kuwait's Borders." *New York Times*, 11 November 1994. A1.

Curtiss, Richard H. "The War That Changes the Middle East in Every Way But One." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, March 1995, 15.

Deveroy, Ann, and Bradley Graham. "36,000 U.S. Ground Troops Due in Gulf; Pentagon Says More Iraqis Near Kuwait." *Washington Post*, 10 October 1994, A1.

Deveroy, Ann, and Bradley Graham. "U.S. Seeks U.N. Stand Against Future Iraqi Buildup." *Washington Post*, 13 October 1994, A1.

Deveroy, Ann, and Thomas W. Lippman. "President Sends More Warplanes to Gulf" *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A1.

Deveroy, Ann. "U.S. Warns Iraq to Pull Back." *Washington Post*, 15 October 1994, A1.

Drozdiak, William. "France Implies Domestic Politics in U.S. Sparked Response to Iraq." *Washington Post*, 13 October 1994, A29.

Dunn, Michael Collins. "Watch on the Gulf." *Air Force Magazine*, April 1995, 60-64.

Fialka, John J. "U.S. Cuts Back Its Forces Headed to Gulf." *Wall Street Journal*, 21 October 1994, A16.

Gibbs, Nancy. "A Show of Strength." *Time*, 24 October 1994. 34-38.

Gordon, Michael R. "U.S. Sends Force as Iraqi Soldiers Threaten Kuwait." *New York Times*, 8 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Keeping the Iraqis Back." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "U.S. Planes and Tanks in the Gulf Area." *New York Times*, 14 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Perry Reports Elite Iraq Army Is Set to Retreat." *New York Times*, 16 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Kuwait Is Allowing U.S. to Station a Squadron of Warplanes." *New York Times*, 28 October 1994, A3.

Goshko, John M. "Sentiment Against U.N. Sanctions on Iraq Grows." *Washington Post*, 7 October 1994, A30.

Gradstein, Linda. "In Iraq, 'Every Day Is Like War.'" *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A14.

Graham, Bradley, and Ruth Marcus. "U.S. Considers Further Restricting Iraq's Military." *Washington Post*, 12 October 1994, A1.

Graham, Bradley. "U.S. Attempts to Avoid Mistakes of 1990 in Gulf." *Washington Post*, 10 October 1994, A17.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Rapid Deployment Plans in the Crucible." *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A12.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Gulf Operation Reassures Pentagon." *Washington Post*, 16

October 1994, A37.

Greenberger, Robert S. "U.S. Plans to Block Future Iraqi Moves On Kuwait Amid Signs of Withdrawal." *Wall Street Journal*, 12 October 1994, A3.

Greenhouse, Steven. "Arab States Withholding Their Support From Baghdad." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994. A13.

Hedges, Chris. "Kuwaiti Troops Vow To Fight This Time." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994, A12.

Hedges, Chris. "Three Years After Gulf War, Sense of Siege Grips Kuwait." *New York Times*, 8 October 1994, A1.

Ibrahim, Youssef M. "Iraq Officials Say Military Won't Attack." *New York Times*, 16 October 1994, A12.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Iraq Is Near Economic Ruin But Hussein Appears Secure." *New York Times*, 25 October 1994, A1.

Jehl, Douglas. "In a New Warning, 356 Aircraft are Ordered in a Single Day." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994, A1.

Kramer, Michael. "The Cost of Removing Saddam." *Time*, 24 October 1994, 39.

Lancaster, John. "Kuwaitis Composed Along Iraqi Border." *Washington Post*, 11 October 1994, A13.

\_\_\_\_\_. "U.S. Buildup in Kuwait May Be Show of Forceful Symbolism." *Washington Post*, 14 October 1994, A33.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Buildup to Counter Iraqis Can Broaden, Perry Warns." *Washington Post*, 15 October 1994, A21.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Finding No Iraqi War, U.S. Forces Take Up Exercises in Kuwait." *Washington Post*, 17 October 1994, A11.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Powerful U.S. Reaction to Iraqi Feint Boosts Kuwaitis' Confidence." *Washington Post*, 19 October 1994, A25.

Lancaster, John, and Julia Preston. "Perry Says Iraqi Threat Easing; U. S. Wins Security Council Vote." *Washington Post*, 16 October 1994, A1.

Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Orders Missiles, 4,000 Troops to the Gulf." *Washington Post*, 9 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Setbacks Aside, Saddam Remains a Thorn." *Washington Post*, 12 October 1994, A27.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Baghdad Remains Far From Full Compliance With U.N. Resolutions." *Washington Post*, 21 October 1994, A28.

Lippman, Thomas W., and Bradley Graham. "Iraqi Troops Move Near Kuwait Border." *Washington Post*, 8 October 1994, A1.

Lippman, Thomas W., and Bradley Graham. "Up to 10,000 Iraqi Troops Stop Retreat From Kuwait Border." *Washington Post*, 14 October 1994, A1.

Lyons, Richard D. "U.N. Council Decides to Keep Economic Sanctions on Iraq." *New York Times*, 15 November 1994, A6.

Melloan, George. "A Few Guesses About What's on Saddam's Mind." *Wall Street Journal*, 10 October 94, A13.

Murphy, Caryle. "Diplomats Say U.N. Measures May Hurt Stability of Region." *Washington Post*, 16 October 1994, A36.

Murphy, Caryle. "Russia Undertakes Diplomatic Initiative To Ease Gulf Crisis." *Washington Post*, 13 October 1994, A31.

Murphy, Caryle. "Saddam Challenging U.S. Will." *Washington Post*, 10 October 1994, A1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Some Iraqi Forces Leave Border Area." *Washington Post*, 12 October 1994, A1.

Preston, Julia. "U.N. Envoy Albright Emerges as Administration's 'Straight Talker.'" *Washington Post*, 14 October 1994, A34.

Preston, Julia, and Thomas W. Lippman. "Allies Warn Iraq Against Troops Shifts." *Washington Post*, 21 October 1994, A1.

Reifenberg, Anne. "Iraq Recognizes Kuwaiti in Bid to End U.N. Sanctions, but Oil Won't Flow Soon." *Wall Street Journal*, 11 November 1994, A5.

Rueters. "No Signs of War Preparations Are Seen in Iraqi Capital." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994, A11.

Sancton, Thomas. "No Longer Fenced In." *Time*, 23 May 1994, 36-38.

Sciolino, Elaine. "Kuwait Crisis: Hussein Gambles to Keep Power." *New York Times*, 11 October 1994, A13.

Shields, Todd. "Misery's Downward Spiral." *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 October 1994, 47.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Saddam Appears in Control of Iraq Despite Efforts to Undermine Him." *Washington Post*, 13 October 1994, A28.

\_\_\_\_\_. "N. Korea, U.S. Reach Nuclear Pact." *Washington Post*, 18 October 1994 A1.

Treaster, Joseph B. "Marines Stage Show Desert Exercise in Show of Force." *New York Times*, 13 October 1994. A16.

Walsh, James. "Saddam's Family Deserts." *Time*, 21 August 1995, 52-53.

William, Daniel. "U.S., in Easing Pressure on Iraq, Feared Coalition Breakup and Shiite State." *Washington Post*, 14 October 1994, A34.

Zimmermann, Tim. "Gun Barrel Diplomacy." *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 October 1994, 42-47.

William, Daniel, and Ann Devroy. "U.S. Applies Two-Pronged Force Policy." *Washington Post*, 16 October 1994, A1.

### **Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Translations and Transcriptions**

al-Kashif, Hasan. "The Blockade and the Arabs," *Al Thawrah*, in Arabic, 11 September 1994, 3. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-180 (11 September 1994): 30.

France-Inter Radio Network, in French, 2200 GMT 9 October 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-WEU-196 (11 October 1994): 32.

France-Inter Radio Network, in French, 2200 GMT 9 October 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-WEU-196 (11 October 1994): 13.

Hammandi, Sabri. "U.S. 'Right' of Intervention," *Al-Thawrah*. in Arabic, 5 September 1994, 2. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-179 (15 September 1994): 31

Iraqi News Agency, in Arabic, 0850 GMT 7 October 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-195 (7 October 1994): 26-27.

Iraqi News Agency, in Arabic, 1640 GMT 10 October 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-196 (11 October 1994): 52.

Iraqi News Agency, in Arabic, 1735 GMT 14 September 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-179 (15 September 1994): 29.

Iraqi News Agency, in Arabic, 1958 GMT 14 September 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-179 (15 September 1994): 29.

Miller, Charles. London Press Association News. in English, 1214 GMT 9 October 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-WEU-196 (11 October 1994): 13

Radio Monte Carlo, in Arabic, 1215 GMT 7 October 1994. *Daily Report*. FBIS-NES-94-195 (7 October 1994): 19.

*Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, in German, 11 October 1994, 2. *Daily Report*. FBIS-WEU-94-196 (11 October 1994): 30.

"Troop Deployment," *Frankfurter Rundschau*. in German, 10 October 1994, 3. *Daily Report*. FBIS-WEU-94-196 (11 October 1994): 29.

## **Government Documents and Official Releases**

Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*. 2 vols. Washington, March 1992.



Armed Forces Information Service. *Defense 95*. Washington, 1995.

FM 100-5. *Operations*, June 1993

Garamone, Jim. "Clinton Praises American Effort in Gulf, Says Troops Making Real Difference." *AFIS Press Pack #48 for the Week of November 28, 1994*. American Forces Information Service, 28 November 1994

Joint Pub 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 25 February 1995.

Joint Pub 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 10 January 1995.

Joint Pub 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 23 March 1994.

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. 1 February 1995.

Joint Pub 3-0 Test. *Unified and Joint Operations*. 1 October 1990.

Final Draft Pub, Joint Pub 3-07. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, April 1993.

Joint Pub 3-07. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995.

Naval Doctrine Publication 1. *Naval Warfare*, 28 March 1994.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). *DoD Background Press Briefing, Attributable to: Senior Defense Official, Subject: Iraq*. Washington, 7 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, DoD News Briefing, Republic of Korea Minister of Defense Rhee Byoung Tae, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry.* Washington, 7 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, Major General Pat Hughes, Lieutenant General John Sheehan.* Washington, 8 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Background Brief, Attributable to: Senior Defense Official, Subject: Iraqi Movement of Troops Toward the Kuwaiti Border and the U.S. Response.* Washington, 9 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS.* Washington, 11 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD PA.* Washington, 11 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Background Briefing, Attributable to: Senior Defense Officials, Subject: Iraqi Troops.* Washington, 12 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DIA Background Briefing on Iraq.* Washington, 13 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Background Briefing, Attributable to: Senior Defense Official, Subject: Developments in Iraq.* Washington, 13 October 1994

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Press Briefing, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch, Mr. Dennis Boxx DATSD(PA).* Washington, 13 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Press Release, Secretary William J. Perry & Senator John Warner Arrival Statement Kuwait City, Kuwait.* Washington, 14 October 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Press Release, Secretary William J. Perry, Senator John Warner, Ambassador Crocker & Mod Sheik Ahmad Al-Hamuud Al-Jabir Al*

*Sabah Press Opportunity, Kuwait City Airport. Washington, 15 October 1995.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Press Briefing, Mr. Dennis Boxx DATSD(PA). Washington, 18 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *Special Briefing on Iraq, Lt. Gen. Howell M Estes III. Washington, 20 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Special Briefing on Iraq. Washington, 20 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Background Briefing, Attributable to: Senior Defense Official, Subject: Iraq. Washington, 20 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, Mr. Dennis Boxx, DATSD PA. Washington, 25 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, Mr. Kenneth Bacon. Washington, 27 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *Press Briefing by General Peay and National Security Advisor Tony Lake, Tactical Assembly Area Liberty, Kuwait. Washington, 28 October 1994.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD News Briefing, Dr. Joseph Nye, ASD, International Security Affairs. Washington, 17 May 1995.*

\_\_\_\_\_. *DoD Background Briefing, Attributable to: Senior Defense Officials, Subject: Iraq. Washington, 17 August 1995.*

Pelletreau, Robert H. "A Review of Developments in the Middle East -- Robert H. Pelletreau." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no 41, 10 October 1994.

Perry, William J. "Using Military Force When Deterrence Fails." *Defense Issues*, vol. 10, no. 80.

U.S. Congress. House. "Report on Developments Concerning National Emergency With Respect to Iraq--Message from the President of the United States (H. Doc. No. 103-289) (House - August 02, 1994)." 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. H6549.

U.S. Congress. House. Comments by Hon. Gerald B. H. Solomon of New York on 7 October 1994, "Iraqi Troops Movements." 103rd Cong., 1st sess. E2225

U.S. Congress. House. Comments by Hon. Edward R. Royce of California on 7 October 1994, "On the Situation in Iraq." 103rd Cong., 1st sess. E2236

U.S. Congress. Senate. "Air Strike Against Iraq (Senate - June 30, 1993)." 103rd Cong., 1st sess. S8275.

U.S. Department of State. *Iraq Human Rights Practices 1994*. Washington, February 1995 1994.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. "Background Notes: Kuwait." Washington, November 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Robert H. Pelletreau: Address by the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at a Town Meeting on U.S. Foreign Policy, Charlotte, North Carolina." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no 49 (26 September 1994).

\_\_\_\_\_. "A GCC Commitment To End the Secondary and Tertiary Boycott--Secretary Christopher, Saudi Crown Prince Saud al-Faysal." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*. vol. 5, no 40 (3 October 1994).

\_\_\_\_\_. "President Clinton, Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan, Israeli Prime Minister Peres, Joint Communiqué." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no. 41 (10 October 1994).

\_\_\_\_\_. "Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Statement Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no 41 (10 October 1994).

\_\_\_\_\_. "Resolution 949." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no 43 (24 October 1994).

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. *Department Of State Daily Press Briefing*. Washington, 11 October 1994 through 15 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at Georgetown University Washington, DC*. Washington, 24 October 1995.

U.S. Department of The Treasury. Office of Foreign Assets Control. *Iraq: What You Need To Know About The U.S. Embargo*. Washington, 23 October 1995.

White House, Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks By The President, Prime Minister Rabin Of Israel and King Hussein Of Jordan in Signing Ceremony*. Washington, 25 July 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks By The President, Foreign Minister Peres Of Israel, and Crown Prince Hassan Of Jordan*. Washington, 3 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Background Briefing By Senior Administration Officials*. Washington, 7 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Press Conference by the President*. Washington, 7 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks By The President Upon Departure For Camp David.*  
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks By The President In Address To The Nation.*  
Washington, 10 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks By The President Upon Departure For Detroit,  
Michigan.* Washington, 11 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Press Briefing By Dee Dee Meyers.* Washington, 12 October  
1994

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks By The President By Satellite To The Radio-Television  
News Directors Association And The National Association Of Broadcasters.*  
Washington, 13 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Press Briefing By Dee Dee Myers.* Washington, 13 October 1994

\_\_\_\_\_. *Radio Address By The President To The Nation.* Washington, 15  
October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Press Briefing by Ambassador Robert Gallucci.* Washington, 18  
October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Statement By The President.* Washington, 18 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Press Conference By The President.* Washington, 21 October  
1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Letter From President Clinton To Congress On Iraq.* Washington,  
28 October 1994.

## Interviews, Unpublished Documents, and Internet Resources

Assistant Secretary of Defense. Directorate for Defense Information. FAX to USCINCCENT. October 7, 1994.

Assistant Secretary of Defense. Public Affairs. *US Forces-Persian Gulf Region-October 6*. OASD-PA-DDI. FAX to USCINCCENT. 7 October 1994.

Baltimore, Perry, Col. USA, Joint Staff, J-5 MEAF during OVW. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, Mac Dill AFB, FL.

Deutch John, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Interview by Ted Koppel. *Nightline*, ABC, 11 October 1994.

Assistant Secretary of Defense. Directorate for Defense Information. FAX from OASD-PA-DDI to USCINCCENT. 14 October 1994.

Fugit, Edward F., Political Advisor to Commander-in-Chief USCENTCOM. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

Gordon, Christopher E., Maj. USA, USCENTCOM CCIJ5-MN. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Iraq—Sanctions and Security," *World Disasters Report 1995*. (<http://kanga.ifrc.org/wdr95/bx2-2.htm>).

Kolton, Randy J., Lt. Col. USA, Special Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief US CENTCOM. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

Marine Corps Public Affairs Office. *Media Advisory and Release 94-784*. Camp Pendleton, CA, 9 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Media Advisory and Release 94-794*. Camp Pendleton, CA, 20 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Media Advisory and Release 94-798*. Camp Pendleton, CA, 26 October 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Marine Force Pacific Commander Deploys to Gulf*. Camp H. M. Smith, HI, 20 October 1994.

Joffe, George, University of London Professor, Interview by John McWethy. *ABC Evening News*, 10 October 1994

Mereness, Gordon H., Maj. USA, CCJ3-OA. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

Oppenheimer, Philip, Maj. USAF, USCENTCOM CCJ3-OA. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

Peay, J. H. Binford III, General USA, USCINCCTNET. "Meeting the Challenge in the Central Command." *Defense Issues*, vol. 10, no. 53. ([http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defense/defenselink/pubs/di\\_index.html](http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defense/defenselink/pubs/di_index.html)).

Peay, J. H. Binford III, General USA, USCINCCENT. Interview by Bryant Gumbel. *Today Show*, NBC, 13 October 1994.

Peck, Allen, Col. USAF, USCENTCOM CCJ3-O. Interview by author, 21 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

Perry, William J. Interview by Catie Couric. *Today Show*, NBC, 10 October 1994.

Perry, William J. Interview by Cokie Roberts. *Nightline*, ABC, 11 October 1994.



Perry, William J. Interview by Jamie McIntyre. *Daybreak*, CNN, 10 October 1994.

Perry, William J. Interview by Robin MacNeil. *MacNeil / Lehrer Newshour*, PBS, 25 October 1994.

Scully, Timothy A., Lt. Col. USA, USCENTCOM CCJ3-OG. Interview by author, 20 February 1996, notes, MacDill AFB, FL.

United States Central Command. *Strategic Plan 1995-1997*.

Vanderbilt University. *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*.  
([gopher://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/](mailto:gopher://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/)).

Williams, Brett, Maj. USAF, USCENTCOM CCJ5 Action Officer. Interview by author, 20 February 1996, notes, Mac Dill AFB, FL.

